State Bar No. 90083
This unlawful detainer action seeks to terminate a tenancy under the Section 8 federal rent subsidy program. 42 U.S.C. §1437f; 24 C.F.R. parts 887, 982. This action is based on a thirty-day notice to quit without cause that is defective for two reasons. The first is that the Section 8 lease and regulations require good cause to terminate the tenancy. Lease, ¶ 9; 24 C.F.R. §982.310(e). The second is that Civil Code §1954.535 requires plaintiff to serve a 90-day notice to terminate a Section 8 tenancy. Both defects are fatal to plaintiff’s case. Annette Osborne moved into the subject premises pursuant to a Section 8 contract on August 28, 1994. Lease, ¶ 2. To qualify for Section 8 assistance, tenants must meet certain income guidelines and other restrictions. 24 C.F.R. §982.201. The Section 8 program is implemented by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) through a local public housing agency, which in this case is the Housing Authority of the County of Los Angeles (HACoLA). 24 C.F.R. §982.1. Section 8 tenants pay about 30% of their adjusted income for rent and the housing authority pays the balance directly to the landlord. 24 C.F.R. §887.353. Rents under the Section 8 program are restricted by federal regulations. Id. In this case, Ms. Osborne is currently paying $144 per month and the housing authority is paying $341 per month for rent. Notice of Contract and Lease Modification (March 7, 2000). Paragraph 9 of the Section 8 contract provides that:
The Section 8 contract thus requires plaintiff to have good cause to terminate the tenancy. The Section 8 regulations require that the good cause reasons be stated in the notice. 24 C.F.R. §982.310(e). This requirement is consistent with California case law construing the Section 8 and other federally subsidized housing programs. Appel v. Beyer (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d Supp. 7, 19; Mitchell v. Poole (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 3. Plaintiff failed to provide Ms. Osborne with a written notice stating the good cause reasons it has to terminate her tenancy, thus its action must fail. Mitchell v. Poole, 203 Cal.App.3d Supp. at 3. IV. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO GIVE MS. OSBORNE A 90-DAY NOTICE AS REQUIRED BY CALIFORNIA LAW Civil Code §1954.535 states:
The Section 8 contract in this action is just the kind of contract addressed by Civil Code §1954.535. The contract is made with a governmental agency, HACoLA, it provides for rent limitations, and it applies to qualified tenants such as Ms. Osborne. Moreover, §1954.535 expressly refers to a situation like this one where a tenant only pays a portion of the rent. Accordingly, plaintiff had to serve her with a 90-day notice, not a 30-day notice. Plaintiff’s counsel has indicated they do not believe Civil Code §1954.535 applies in this case because it is part of the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act which, according to plaintiff’s counsel, "covers residential rent control." Nothing in the Costa Hawkins Rental Housing Act, however, limits its application to municipal rent controlled tenancies. Civil Code §1954.51 sets forth the chapter’s definitions. "Residential real property" is defined to include "any dwelling or unit that is intended for human habitation." Id., subd. (e) (emphasis added). "Tenancy" is defined to include "the lawful occupation of property and includes a lease or sublease." Id., subd. (f). Nothing in the definitions or other provisions of the chapter limit its provisions to rental units in rent controlled jurisdictions. Moreover, the terms of §1954.535 contemplate federally subsidized housing, particularly housing subsidized under the Section 8 program, in that it provides the tenant need not pay more than her "portion of the rent" during the 90-day notice period. Plaintiff’s counsel is correct that the heading under Chapter 2.7 states "residential rent control." Titles of statutes, however, do not control their meaning or application. Da Fonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 602 ("Title or chapter headings are unofficial and do not alter the explicit scope, meaning, or intent of a statute."). Moreover, the Section 8 program limits the amount of rent a landlord can charge, thus it is one form of residential rent control. Even if Chapter 2.7 were limited only to rent-controlled tenancies, nothing limits its application only to tenancies governed by city- or county-mandated rent controls. It applies to all residential rent controlled properties, even federally-governed rent controlled tenancies.
Plaintiff’s failure to serve defendant with a 90-day notice stating a good cause reason to terminate her tenancy is fatal to its case. Judgment should be entered for defendant. Date: San Fernando Valley Neighborhood Legal Services, Inc.
_________________________________ David Pallack, Attorneys for Defendant |
