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National Housing Law
Project
Housing
Law Bulletin |
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Native Alaskan Mutual Housing Participants
Receive Foreclosure Protections
In a clear rejection of HUD's efforts to deprive Mutual Help homebuyers
of basic procedural protections, the Alaska Supreme Court recently ruled
that a housing authority may not use eviction proceedings to litigate an
alleged breach of the homebuyer's contract. Kopanuk v. AVCP Regional Housing
Authority, 902 P.2d 813 (Alaska Sept. 15, 1995). HUD's Mutual Help Homeownership
Opportunity Program has subsidized the development of thousands of units
of housing for native people, offering the opportunity for homeownership
to many natives of low income.1 This court's
ruling may assist other native homebuyers outside of Alaska to obtain recognition
of similar protections, and its reasoning may benefit would-be homebuyers
under other subsidy programs.2
The Mutual Help Homeownership Opportunity Program provides subsidies
to housing authorities to make available homeownership opportunities for
low-income participants. Under the program, the prospective homebuyer must
make, or have made on his or her behalf through a native corporation, a
nonrefundable contribution of land. The participant must also execute the
Mutual Help and Occupancy Agreement (MHOA), a HUD form contract, with the
IHA. Under the MHOA, a homebuyer makes monthly payments, a minimum portion
of which goes toward administrative expenses, with surpluses being credited
to a "equity payments account." The monthly payment depends upon the homebuyer's
income. To achieve homeownership more quickly, the homebuyer may also make
additional voluntary overpayments to another equity account. The purchase
price for the home declines over a period of 25 years, eventually reaching
zero, and the home may also be purchased at any time during the contract's
terms upon the satisfaction of several conditions. In the event of a termination
of the contract, the homebuyer receives a refund of any amounts remaining
in the equity account(s), once delinquencies or necessary repair costs
are covered.
At issue in this case was the simple question of whether, upon an alleged
breach of the MHOA, the housing authority could regain possession by using
the state statutory forcible entry and detainer (eviction) proceeding,
or whether instead the IHA was required to seek another possessory remedy,
such as ejectment or foreclosure.
There is nothing unusual about the facts underlying this dispute. After
about 10 years into the contract, the homebuyer fell behind in his payments
and also left the housing for an extended period, both alleged breaches
of the MHOA. The housing authority then filed an eviction action, which
was settled with entry of a conditional order for possession. When the
homebuyer failed to return to the village, the IHA sought enforcement of
the order. The homebuyer then sought to vacate the order, challenging the
subject matter jurisdiction of the district court, claiming that the MHOA
was not a lease but instead involved equitable interests not cognizable
in an eviction action. Both the district court and the appellate court
rejected the homebuyer's position, holding that the MHOA was a lease-purchase
agreement, which was properly the subject of an eviction proceeding and
within the jurisdiction of the district court. The Alaska Supreme Court
then granted the homebuyer's petition for a hearing and reversed.
The IHA had essentially claimed that the MHOA was a lease-option. It
pointed to a list of homebuyer obligations under the MHOA similar to those
established by Alaska's version of the Uniform Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act. It also emphasized a number of other provisions similar to
obligations imposed upon subsidized housing tenants, such as income reporting
and inspection requirements, restrictions on allowable residents and a
ban on subletting, as well as the IHA's control of insurance for the property.
The homebuyer, on the other hand, emphasized a number of provisions
as evidence that the MHOA was an installment sale contract, not a lease-option.
He pointed to the use of the term "homebuyer" in the agreement (rather
than tenant), the nonrefundable contribution of land, the existence of
equity accounts, the ability to purchase during the term of the contract
upon payment of the current balance, and so forth.
The Alaska Supreme Court first clarified that eviction jurisdiction
includes an award of possession, which constitutes equitable relief. Although
the court recognized that an eviction action may result in equitable relief,
these are swift and summary proceedings, unsuited for resolution of more
complex disputes involving equitable ownership interests. As a general
matter, eviction courts do not have jurisdiction over all equitable actions.
The court properly framed the issue of the district court's jurisdiction
as depending upon whether equitable interests existed in the dispute, not
whether equitable relief could be awarded. The court resisted the temptation
to label the MHOA as either a lease-option or installment sale, instead
recognizing it as a "hybrid" contract extremely difficult to categorize.
Critical for the court was that the contract creates equitable interests
in the homebuyer, in contrast to the status of a tenant with no equity
facing dispossession under a summary eviction proceedings. A homebuyer's
equity may come from the land contributed to the transaction, capital improvements,
appreciation in value, or direct equity contributions. For the court, this
potential equity was enough to remove the case from summary eviction jurisdiction.
HUD had submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of the IHA's position,
touting its consistent interpretation of the MHOA as a lease. Relegating
HUD's position to a footnote, the court found HUD's regulations irrelevant.3
The court found equitable interests despite HUD's denial of their existence,
and this finding was determinative. The existence of equitable interests
under state law was sufficient to deprive the district court of jurisdiction
under the summary eviction process. The court recognized that HUD is without
power to interpret state laws, and HUD's regulations do not preempt or
otherwise override state law on this point.
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See 24 C.F.R. Part 905, Subpart E (1995).
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For example, many public housing authorities (PHAs) and Indian Housing
Authorities (IHAs) operate units under HUD's "Turnkey III" program, in
which homeowners built equity toward the goal of eventual homeownership.
See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. Part 905, Subpart G (IHA Turnkey III program) and
Part 904, Subpart B (PHA Turnkey III program) (1995).
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HUD's regulation states,
[T]he IHA may terminate the MHO agreement by written notice
…enforced by eviction procedures applicable to landlord-tenant relationships.
Foreclosure is an inappropriate method for enforcing termination of the
homeownership agreement, which constitutes a lease (with an option to purchase).
The homebuyer is a lessee during the term of the agreement and acquires
no equitable interest in the home until the option to purchase is exercised.
24 C.F.R. § 905.446(a) (1995).
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