National Housing Law Project Housing Law Bulletin

Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority¹ is probably the longest running housing case in the country. In 1966, a group of black residents of Chicago public housing filed two suits, one against the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and the other against the Secretary of HUD. The claims were that the housing authority, in violation of the equal protection clause and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, had located almost all of its public housing in African American neighborhoods and had steered black applicants away from the four white projects that were located in white neighborhoods. Against HUD, the claims were that it had supported the housing authority in these discriminatory actions.

Plaintiffs’ secured a judgment against CHA in 1969² and, after litigation that traveled throughout the federal judiciary, secured a consent decree against HUD in 1981.³ The 1969 judgment against CHA was designed to remedy the discrimination in site selection and tenant assignment in which the housing authority had engaged. It prohibited the PHA from constructing any new public housing in a neighborhood in which more than 30 percent of the occupants were people of color — "limited areas" — unless an equal number of units were being developed in neighborhoods with fewer people of color — "general areas." Because it was issued in 1969, the judgment did not mention the Section 8 program which was not enacted until 1974.

The consent decree against HUD did cover Section 8 certificates and New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation projects as well as public housing. It barred HUD from funding Section 8 in Chicago and its surrounding counties if more than 30 percent of the assisted units were located in limited areas, and at least one third had to be were located in general areas or revitalizing areas. The obligations of the consent decree against HUD were to terminate once 7,100 households had secured housing assistance in the general or revitalizing areas.

On October 2, 1996, the magic number of 7,100 was reached and HUD moved to terminate the consent decree. Simultaneously, the plaintiffs moved: (1) to secure relief against HUD for its previously having allowed CHA to use more than 30 percent of the certificates in the limited areas, (2) to modify the judgment against CHA to cover the Section 8 certificate and voucher programs as well as public housing, and (3) to get one last year of project-based Section 8 funding from HUD. The court granted HUD’s motion to terminate the consent decree and denied all three of the plaintiffs’ motions.⁴

The plaintiffs did not oppose the termination of the consent decree, because the 7,100 figure had been reached. Instead, they sought enforcement of the decree against HUD because, right from the start, HUD had funded CHA’s certificate program even though more that 30 percent of the participating families were using their certificates in the limited areas. The court rejected plaintiffs’ motion, primarily because of their delay in seeking relief. The violations had been going on right from the beginning of the consent decree. If plaintiffs had raised the matter earlier, HUD would have been able to ask the court to waive the requirement or reclassify some areas as general or revitalizing. Moreover, the harm arising from the tenants’ choice to use the certificates in the limited areas was not clear and thus an appropriate remedy, if any, was hard to fashion, especially without any suggestions from the plaintiffs. As a result, the court refused to place any further obligations upon HUD regarding funding of the certificate and voucher programs in Chicago.

The plaintiffs’ alternative method of securing judicial control of the administration of the certificate and voucher programs would have been to have the judgment against the housing authority modified. Plaintiffs’ argument was that CHA had made little progress building new public housing in the general areas — only 3,000 units had been built, when the class was composed of 40,000 households — and that, since 1969, Section 8 had replaced public housing as the means for providing housing assistance to poor families.

The court rejected this motion as well. It viewed as its responsibility to stick with the original decree unless plaintiffs proved that the objectives of the decree were not being achieved and that the lack of progress was in some way the defendants’ fault, either because of what they had done originally or their failure to cooperate with the remedy. In the court’s view, the plaintiffs had not provided the needed evidence. The court acknowledged that the progress was slow, but noted that the construction program did not really begin until the court appointed a receiver in 1987, and since then CHA had been cooperating with the receiver. In addition, although plaintiffs had asserted that the vast majority of the PHA’s units were still segregated and located in segregated neighborhoods, they had provided no supporting evidence. There was no evidence regarding the projects that had previously been all white nor any proof regarding the number of other projects still in segregated neighborhoods. In addition, the court expressed a need for evidence about why the segregation persisted, if it did, whether the reasons were ones for which the CHA was responsible, what CHA’s current remedial efforts were, and how CHA would be responsible for the tenants’ use of certificates in the limited areas. It found no evidence on these points. Without any, it refused to extend the original judgment to cover the Section 8 program.

The other issue raised by the plaintiffs was whether HUD should have funded any Section 8 projects in Fiscal Year 1997. The consent decree obliged HUD to set aside funding each fiscal year for 350 units of project-based Section 8 housing to be used in the general and revitalizing areas until the magic number of 7,100 had been reached. An earlier opinion of the court had established that the funds were to be set aside on the first day of the fiscal year. On October 1, 1996, the first day of FY 1997, the magic number had not been reached, because it was not until October 2, 1996, that the 7,100th household received assistance. Thus the plaintiffs argued that HUD should fund 350 more units of project-based assistance in FY 1997.

The court rejected this argument as well. Although it acknowledged that HUD was obliged to set aside the funding on October 1st, it found no obligation to continue to make the funds available once the 7,100 number was reached, in the absence of a contractual commitment to a specific project before that time.

1. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1967), subsequent opinion, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969), subsequent order, 304 F. Supp. 736 (1969); Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971), subsequent opinion, Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665 (N.D. Ill. 1981), aff’d, 690 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1982).
2. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
3. Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665 (N.D. Ill. 1981), aff’d, 690 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1982).
4. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., Nos. 66 C 1459/1460, 1997 WL 534369 (N.D. Ill. memorandum opinion and order Aug. 27, 1997).